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Abstract. Analyzing Ethereum bytecode, rather than the source code
from which it was generated, is a necessity when: (1) the source code
is not available (e.g., the blockchain only stores the bytecode), (2) the
information to be gathered in the analysis is only visible at the level
of bytecode (e.g., gas consumption is specified at the level of EVM in-
structions), (3) the analysis results may be affected by optimizations
performed by the compiler (thus the analysis should be done ideally
after compilation). This paper presents EthIR, a framework for ana-
lyzing Ethereum bytecode, which relies on (an extension of) Oyente, a
tool that generates CFGs; EthIR produces from the CFGs, a rule-based
representation (RBR) of the bytecode that enables the application of
(existing) high-level analyses to infer properties of EVM code.
1 Introduction
Means of creating distributed consensus have given rise to a family of dis-
tributed protocols for building a replicated transaction log (a blockchain). These
technological advances enabled the creation of decentralised cryptocurrencies,
such as Bitcoin [8]. Ethereum [12], one of Bitcoin’s most prominent successors,
adds Turing-complete stateful computation associated with funds-exchanging
transactions—so-called smart contracts—to replicated distributed storage.
Smart contracts are small programs stored in a blockchain that can be in-
voked by transactions initiated by parties involved in the protocol, executing
some business logic as automatic and trustworthy mediators. Typical applica-
tions of smart contracts involve implementations of multi-party accounting, vot-
ing and arbitration mechanisms, auctions, as well as puzzle-solving games with
reward distribution. To preserve the global consistency of the blockchain, every
transaction involving an interaction with a smart contract is replicated across the
system. In Ethereum, replicated execution is implemented by means of a uniform
execution back-end—Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [12]—a stack-based op-
erational formalism, enriched with a number of primitives, allowing contracts
to call each other, refer to the global blockchain state, initiate sub-transactions,
and even create new contract instances dynamically. That is, EVM provides a
convenient compilation target for multiple high-level programming languages for
implementing Ethereum-based smart contracts. In contrast with prior low-level
languages for smart contract scripting, EVM features mutable persistent state
that can be modified, during a contract’s lifetime, by parties interacting with it.
Finally, in order to tackle the issue of possible denial-of-service attacks, EVM
comes with a notion of gas—a cost semantics of virtual machine instructions.
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All these features make EVM a very powerful execution formalism, simul-
taneously making it quite difficult to formally analyse its bytecode for possible
inefficiencies and vulnerabilities—a challenge exacerbated by the mission-critical
nature of smart contracts, which, after having been deployed, cannot be amended
or taken off the blockchain.
Contributions. In this work, we take a step further towards sound and auto-
mated reasoning about high-level properties of Ethereum smart contracts.
– We do so by providing EthIR, an open-source tool for precise decompila-
tion of EVM bytecode into a high-level representation in a rule-based form;
EthIR is available via GitHub: https://github.com/costa-group/ethIR.
– Our representation reconstructs high-level control and data-flow for EVM
bytecode from the low-level encoding provided in the CFGs generated by
Oyente. It enables application of state-of-the-art analysis tools developed
for high-level languages to infer properties of bytecode.
– We showcase this application by conducting an automated resource analysis
of existing contracts from the blockchain inferring their loop bounds.
2 From EVM to a Rule-based Representation
The purpose of decompilation –as for other bytecode languages (see, e.g., the
Soot analysis and optimization framework [11])– is to make explicit in a higher-
level representation the control flow of the program (by means of rules which
indicate the continuation of the execution) and the data flow (by means of
explicit variables, which represent the data stored in the stack, in contract fields,
in local variables, and in the blockchain), so that an analysis or transformation
tool can have this control flow information directly available.
2.1 Extension of Oyente to Generate the CFG
Given some EVM code, the Oyente tool generates a set of blocks that store the
information needed to represent the CFG of such EVM code. However, when the
jump address of a block is not unique (depends on the flow of the program), the
blocks generated by Oyente sometimes only store the last value of the jump
address (this is because it is enough for the kind of symbolic execution they
perform). We have modified the structure of Oyente blocks in order to include
all possible jump addresses, so that the whole CFG is reconstructed. As an
example, Fig. 1 shows the Solidity source code for a fragment of a contract (left),
and the CFG generated from it (right). Observe that in the CFGs generated by
our extension of Oyente, the instructions SSTORE or SLOAD are annotated
with an identifier of the contract field they operate on (for instance, a SSTORE
operation that stores a value on the contract field 0 is replaced by SSTORE
0). Similarly, the EVM instructions MSTORE and MLOAD instructions are
annotated with the memory address they operate on (such addresses will be
transformed into variables in the RBR whenever possible). These annotations
cannot be generated when the memory address is not statically known, though,
(for instance, when we have an array access inside a loop with a variable index).
In such cases, we annotate the corresponding instructions with “?”.
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contract BlockKing {
· · ·
uint public warriorBlock;
uint public kingBlock;
· · ·
function kingBlock(){
uint var = kingBlock;
· · ·
}
function process payment() {
uint singleDigit = warriorBlock;
· · ·
while (singleDigit > 10) {
singleDigit −= 10;
}
· · ·
}
}
Fig. 1. Solidity code (left), and EVM code for process_payment within CFG (right).
Finally, when we have Solidity code available, we are able to retrieve the name
of the functions invoked from the hash codes (see e.g. Block 152 in which we
have annotated in the second bytecode kingBlock, the name of the function to
be invoked). This allows us to statically know the continuation block.
2.2 From the CFG to Guarded Rules
The translation from EVM into our rule-based representation is done by applying
the translation in Def. 1 to each block in a CFG. The identifiers given to the
rules –block x or jump x– use x, the PC of the first bytecode in the block being
translated. We distinguish among three cases: (1) if the last bytecode in the block
is an unconditional jump (JUMP), we generate a single rule, with an invocation to
the continuation block, (2) if it is a conditional jump (JUMPI) we produce two
additional guarded rules which represent the continuation when the condition
holds, and when it does not, (3) otherwise, we continue the execution in block
x+s (where s is the size of the EVM bytecodes in the block being translated).
As regards the variables, we distinguish the following types:
1. Stack variables: a key ingredient of the translation is that the stack is flat-
tened into variables, i.e., the part of the stack that the block is using is rep-
resented, when it is translated into a rule, by the explicit variables s0, s1, . . .,
where s1 is above s0, and so on. The initial stack variables are obtained as
parameters s0, s1, . . . , sn and denoted as s¯n.
2. Local variables: the content of the local memory in numeric addresses ap-
pearing in the code, which are accessed through MSTORE and MLOAD
with the given address, are modelled with variables l0, l1, . . . , lr, denoted as
l¯r, and are passed as parameters. For the translation, we assume we are
given a map lmap which associates a different local variable to every nu-
meric address memory used in the code. When the address is not numeric,
we represent it using a fresh variable local to the rule to indicate that we do
not have information on this memory location.
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3. Contract fields: we model fields with variables g0, . . . , gk, denoted as g¯k,
which are passed as parameters. Since these fields are accessed using SSTORE
and SLOAD using the number of the field, we associate gi to the ith field.
As for the local memory, if the number of the field is not numeric because it
is unknown (annotated as “?”), we use a fresh local variable to represent it.
4. Blockchain data: we model this data with variables bc, which are either
indexed with md0, . . . ,mdq when they represent the message data, or with
corresponding names, if they are precise information of the call, like the
gas, which is accessed with the opcode GAS, or about the blockchain, like
the current block number, which is accessed with the opcode NUMBER.
All this data is accessed through dedicated opcodes, which may consume
some offsets of the stack and normally place the result on top of the stack
(although some of them, like CALLDATACOPY, can store information in
the local memory).
The translation uses an auxiliary function τ to translate each bytecode into cor-
responding high-level instructions (and updates the size of the stack m) and
τG to translate the guard of a conditional jump. The grammar of the resulting
RBR language into which the EVM is translated is given in Fig. 2. We optionally
can keep in the RBR the original bytecode instructions from which the higher-
level ones are obtained by simply wrapping them within a nop functor (e.g.,
nop(DUPN)). This is relevant for a gas analyzer to assign the precise gas con-
sumption to the higher-level instruction in which the bytecode was transformed.
Definition 1. Given a block B with instructions b1, . . . , bi in a CFG starting at
PC x, and local variables map lmap, the generated rules are:
if bi ≡ JUMP p
block x(s¯n, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq) ⇒ τ(b1, . . . , bi−1), call(block p(s¯m−1, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq))
if bi ≡ JUMPI p
block x(s¯n, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq) ⇒ τ(b1, . . . , bc−1), call(jump x(s¯m, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq))
jump x(s¯n, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq) ⇒ τG(bc, . . . , bi−2)|call(block p(s¯m, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq))
jump x(s¯n, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq) ⇒ ¬τG(bc, . . . , bi−2)|call(block (x+ s)(s¯m, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq))
if bi 6≡ JUMP and bi 6≡ JUMPI
block x(s¯n, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq) ⇒ τ(b1, . . . , bi), call(block (x+ i)(s¯m, g¯k, l¯r, ¯bcq))
where functions τ and τG for some representative bytecodes are:
τ(JUMPDEST) = {}; m := m
τ(PUSHN v) = {sm+1 = v}; m := m+ 1
τ(DUPN) = {sm+1 = sm+1−N}; m := m+ 1
τ(SWAPN) = {sm+1 = sm, sm = sm−N , sm−N = sm+1}; m := m
τ(ADD|SUB|MUL|DIV) = {sm−1 = sm + | − | ∗ |/sm−1}; m := m− 1
τ(SLOAD|MLOAD v) = {sm = gv|llmap(v)}; m := m if v is numeric
= {gl|ll = sm, sm = fresh()}; m := m otherwise
τ(SSTORE|MSTORE v) = {gv|llmap(v) = sm−1}; m := m− 2 if v is numeric
= {gs1|ls1 = sm−1, gs2|ls2 = sm}; m := m− 2 otherwise
. . .
τG(GT,ISZERO)|τG(GT) = leq(sm, sm−1)|gt(sm, sm−1); m := m− 2
τG(EQ,ISZERO)|τG(EQ) = neq(sm, sm−1)|eq(sm, sm−1); m := m− 2
. . .
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RBR → (B | J) RBR | 
B → block id (in, gk, lr, bc)⇒ Instr (Call | )
J → jump id (in, gk, lr, bc)⇒ InstrJ
Instr → S Instr | 
S → s = Exp
Exp → num | x | x+ y | x− y | x ∗ y | x/y | x%y | xy
| and(x, y) | or(x, y) | xor(x, y) | not(x)
Call → call(block id(in, gk, lr, bc)) | call(jump id(in, gk, lr, bc))
InstrJ → Guard ”|” call(block id(in, gk, lr, bc))
Guard → eq(x, y) | neq(x, y) | lt(x, y) | leq(x, y) | gt(x, y) | geq(x, y)
Fig. 2. Grammar of the RBR into which the EVM is translated
– c is the index of the instruction, where the guard of the conditional jump
starts. Note that the condition ends at the index i− 2 and there is always a
PUSH at i− 1. Since the pushed address (that we already have in p) and the
result of the condition are consumed by the JUMPI, we do not store them in
stack variables.
– m represents the size of the stack for the block. Initially we have m := n.
– variables gs1, gs2 and gl, and ls1, ls2 and ll, are local to each rule and
are used to represent the use of SLOAD and SSTORE, and MLOAD and
MSTORE, when the given address is not a concrete number. For SLOAD and
MLOAD we also use fresh(), to denote a generator of fresh variables to safely
represent the unknown value of the loaded address.
Example 1. As an example, an excerpt of the RBR obtained by translating the
three blocks on the right-hand side of Fig. 1 is as follows (selected instructions
keep using nop annotations the bytecode from which they have been obtained):
block152(s0, g11, l8, bc)⇒
s1 = s0 nop(DUP1)
s2 = 6584849474 nop(PUSH4)
call(jump152(s2, g11, l8, bc)
nop(EQ) nop(PUSH2) nop(JUMPI)
jump152(s2, g11, l8, bc)⇒
eq(s2, s1)
call(block694(s0, g11, l8, bc)
jump152(s2, g11, l8, bc)⇒
neq(s2, s1)
call(block163(s0, g11, l8, bc)
block694(s0, g11, l8, bc)⇒
s1 = 754 nop(PUSH2)
s2 = 7 nop(PUSH1)
s2 = g7 nop(SLOAD)
s3 = s1 nop(DUP2)
call(block754(s2, g11, l8, bc)
nop(JUMP)
block754(s2, g11, l8, bc)⇒
s3 = 64 nop(PUSH1)
s4 = s3 nop(DUP1)
s4 = l0 nop(MLOAD)
s5 = s4
s4 = s2
s2 = s5 nop(SWAP2)
s5 = s2 nop(DUP3)
l1 = s4 nop(MSTORE)
s3 = l0 nop(MLOAD)
· · ·
s3 = s4 − s3 nop(SUB)
s4 = 32 nop(PUSH1)
s3 = s4 + s3 nop(ADD)
· · ·
3 Case Study: Bounding Loops in EVM using SACO
To illustrate the applicability of our framework, we have analyzed quantitative
properties of EVM code by translating it into our intermediate representation
and analyzing it with the high-level static analyzer SACO [3]. SACO is able
to infer, among other properties, upper bounds on the number of iterations of
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loops. Note that this is the first crucial step to infer the gas consumption of
smart contracts, a property of much interest [4]. The internal representation of
SACO (described in [2]) matches the grammar in Fig. 2 after minor syntactic
translations (that we have solved implementing a simple translator that is avail-
able in github, named saco.py). As SACO does not have bit-operations (namely
and, or, xor, and not), our translator replaces such operations by fresh variables
so that the analyzer forgets the information on bit variables. After this, for our
running example, we prove termination of the 6 loops that it contains and pro-
duce a linear bound for those loops. We have included in our github other smart
contracts together with the loop bounds inferred by SACO for them. Other high-
level analyzers that work on intermediate forms like Integer transition systems
or Horn clauses (e.g., AproVe, T2, VeryMax, CoFloCo) could be easily adapted
as well to work on our RBR translated programs.
4 Related Approaches and Tools
In the past two years, several approaches tackled the challenge of fully formal
reasoning about Ethereum contracts implemented directly in EVM bytecode by
modeling its rigorous semantics in state-of-the-art proof assistants [5, 6]. While
those mechanisations enabled formal machine-assisted proofs of various safety
and security properties of EVM contracts [5], none of them provided means for
fully automated analysis of EVM bytecode.
Concurrently, several other approaches for ensuring correctness and security of
Ethereum contracts took a more agressive approach, implementing automated
toolchains for detecting bugs by symbolically executing EVM bytecode [7, 9].
However, low-level EVM representation poses difficulties in applying those tools
immediately for analysis of more high-level properties. For instance, represen-
tation of EVM in Oyente, a popular tool for analysis of Ethereum smart con-
tracts [1] is too low-level to implement analyses of high-level properties, e.g.,
loop complexity or commutativity conditions. Porosity [10] is a decompiler
from (a subset of) EVM directly into Solidity. Since Solidity does not have
a formal semantics, it is not well-suited for performing program analyses.
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